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ABSTRACT

Intrusion detection (ID) systems have become increasingly accepted as an essential layer in the information security
infrastructure. However, there has been little research into understanding the human component of ID work. Currently,
security analysts face an increasing workload as their environments expand and attacks become more frequent. We conducted
contextual interviews with security analysts to gain an understanding of the people and work of ID. Our findings reveal that
organizational changes must be combined with improved technical tools for effective, long-term solutions to the difficulties
of scaling ID work. We propose a three-phase task model in which tasks could be decoupled according to requisite expertise.
In particular, monitoring tasks can be separated and staffed by less experienced ID analysts with corresponding tool support.
Thus, security analysts will be better able to cope with increasing security threats in their expanding networks. Additionally,
organizations will be afforded more flexibility in hiring and training new analysts.
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INTRODUCTION

In this Internet era, organizational dependence on networked information technology and its underlying infrastructure has
grown explosively. In conjunction with this growth, the frequency and severity of network-based attacks have also drastically
increased (Allen, Christie, Fithen, McHugh, Pickel, and Stoner, 1999). At the same time, there is an inverse relationship
between the decreasing expertise required to execute attacks and the increasing sophistication of those attacks – less skill is
needed to do more damage (McHugh, 2001). Despite concerted efforts on preventative security measures, vulnerabilities
remain. These are due to programming errors, design flaws in foundational protocols, and the “insider” abuse problem of
legitimate users misusing their privileges (Lee, Stolfo, and Mok, 2000). Because of this, intrusion detection (ID), the subdiscipline of information security that monitors network events for signs of malicious or abnormal activity, has become an
integral component in many organizations’ approaches to security. While it may be theoretically possible to remove all
security vulnerabilities through formal methods and better engineering practices, it is practically infeasible (Hofmeyr,
Forrest, and Somayaji, 1998). Thus, ID will remain a crucial security practice for years to come.
Network intrusion detection systems (IDS) assist security analysts by automatically identify potential attacks from network
activity and produce alerts describing the details of these intrusions. The type of network IDS that all of our participants use
is signature-based. This operates by matching patterns of known intrusions or misuse against network activity to detect and
classify attacks. The IDS is the last, and sometimes only, line of defense. If locks and safes in the physical world equate to
preventative security in the virtual world, then an IDS is analogous to a burglar alarm. If the IDS produces an accurate alert, it
affords the security analyst a last opportunity to respond before the damage is done.
The bulk of ID research has focused on improving the accuracy and coverage of IDSs. Surprisingly, there has been very little
research into understanding and supporting the human analysts’ ID-related tasks. The work of doing ID is an amalgam of
complex tasks that requires extensive experience and knowledge. Analysts must continually monitor their IDS for signs of
illicit activity. The sheer number of alerts generated by an IDS can be overwhelming. Current IDSs can trigger thousands of
alarms per day, up to 99% of which are false positives (Julisch and Dacier, 2002). At the same time, analysts must keep up to
date with changing configurations in their operating environment and newly discovered vulnerabilities or intrusion methods.
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Although there are no in-depth workplace studies of security analysts, Yurcik, Barlow, and Rosendale (2003) do describe the
complexities of system administrators’ work based on the authors’ first hand experiences at National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). This work frames the central ID challenge – the asymmetry between attackers and
defenders, which gives the former the advantage in this escalating battle. Administrators must continuously identify and
repair every vulnerability in their environment, while an attacker need only find a single vulnerable system to exploit. The
attacker only has to hit once, while administrators must protect against all possible attacks.
Analysts responsible for defending their organization’s network infrastructure face a difficult struggle to stay current with
attackers’ strategies and to be ever vigilant over their own environment. Their work is complex, requiring a great deal of
expertise and experience in a particular environment. Finding individuals that fulfill these requirements is difficult. As
networks grow and security threats increase, organizations will be hard pressed to find analysts that posses the requisite
expertise to immediately accomplish effective ID.
Many researchers are working to provide support for these overburdened defenders, focusing on technological solutions to
problems such as the excessive number of false positives and the inability of most IDSs to recognize novel attacks. These
solutions, once available to practitioners in the field, will provide some temporary relief. To find long-term solutions, the
underlying behaviors of ID work must be understood. Only then can appropriate “fit-to-task” technologies be designed and
implemented. The results of this study offer a first step in this direction. Understanding the ID task decomposition, we have
identified a viable socio-technical solution by rethinking existing staffing strategies and introducing a new class of IT support
tools.
METHODOLOGY

Our research seeks to gain a situated understanding of the work of ID and the people who do it. To this end, we have
conducted contextual interviews with information security experts to explore the mundane and exceptional processes of their
day-to-day ID activity. The interviews were conducted in situ when possible, encouraging participants to demonstrate their
interactions with their current IDSs and other support tools. Due to security policies, we were not allowed access to the actual
working environment of all participants. In these three cases, the participants brought screenshots of their systems to
demonstrate their interaction. The format of the interviews was semi-structured, generally following a prepared interview
guide though allowing elaboration off topic. We conducted nine interviews that lasted from one to two and a half hours.
Quotes from our participants are identified by number (P1-P9) in our text. The use of qualitative methods for this research
was necessary to establish a rich description of ID work, notably the interactions between the human analysts and their
systems. However, this approach forces a balance between population sample size and depth of data collection, in favor of
the latter. All interviews and observations were transcribed and content coded, following grounded theory analytic protocols
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
The participants had wide-ranging levels of ID experience, primary job duties, and organizational security needs. It was
important to include a diverse cross-section of ID experts to ensure that our results were not limited to any single type of user
or organization. All participants possessed a working knowledge of at least one IDS. Snort, an open-source, signature-based
network IDS (Roesch, 1999), was the most common in a suite of often used tools. The participants’ organizations and
corresponding security practices ranged from the relatively open environments of university settings to the highly secure
defense contractors, financial companies, and web service providers. The primary roles of the participants varied: most were
network or systems administrators whose duties included ID, while two were dedicated information security analysts and two
were IDS developers consulting for other IT departments in their organization. The participants’ time spent on ID also varied
greatly; for some, ID was a small part of their daily activities, but for others it consumed the majority of their time. Two
security officers spent all of their time on security related tasks, of which ID played a major role; these were the only
participants who had an inexperienced, small, but dedicated staff to assist in ID tasks. The two security researchers spent
from half to three quarters of their time working on ID tasks, with a large chunk was devoted to new systems development
and testing. The remainder of the participants, network or systems administrators, spent much less time doing ID as a part of
their daily routine. For all, the amount of time for some tasks, particularly monitoring, was highly dependent on the
environment and the nature of the IDS.
It is important to note that “most people aren’t just analysts” (P3). Interacting with the IDS is just one part of a job that
includes other systems, network, or security related tasks. This is particularly true in smaller companies where a dedicated
security person is not likely to be cost effective because the organization does not believe their threat level to be high enough
or the organizational security needs are limited. For example:
That’s how I describe myself now, more of a systems administrator who does security work, because my company
isn’t big enough to have a security person full time. Even with a hundred employees, I think I could spend my entire
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day, every day of the year doing security stuff, making things better than they are now, but from the company’s
point of view, they don’t need that. (P9)
This analyst works primary as the systems administrator for several dozen machines, but is also responsible for all of the
organization’s information security needs. This is typical of analysts being pulled in two directions by their organizational
responsibilities.
DOING THE WORK OF INTRUSION DETECTION

Providing security requires an integration of tasks that include ID, preventative technologies for “hardening” systems,
implementing encryption and authentication schemes, and educating users in safety-smart work practices. The work of ID
involves more than reviewing IDS alerts and occasionally responding to critical events. ID itself cannot be accomplished
effectively in isolation, it also requires monitoring and analyzing systems tangential to the IDS, as well as keeping abreast of
the latest security information. Although there are subtle differences in how security analysts perform ID, all of our
participants followed a similar process, which we analytically abstracted into three task phases: monitoring, analysis, and
response. Each will be discussed in turn.
Monitoring

The first phase of ID work involves the ongoing surveillance of systems and network activity looking for indications of
anomalous or malicious activity. This process is centered on the IDS, but is augmented by other monitoring tools and
vulnerability scanners. In addition, analysts monitor an extensive set of resources, including web sites and mailing lists, for
news of new attacks and vulnerabilities. These are the mundane daily tasks of ID. One analyst described how “keeping up
with everything” constituted the majority of her time.
The number of alerts generated by most IDSs, especially on large, heterogeneous networks, can quickly become
overwhelming. Because the role of the analyst usually involves more responsibilities than ID, coping with information
overload forces a difficult choice. She can choose to limit the IDS signature set and thus the number of alerts, or be inundated
with alerts to the point where she loses her ability to monitor the data on an individual level. An analyst who severely limits
the signature set, can dramatically reduce the number of false positives. One analyst rationalizes this strategy as follows:
We also have a very limited signature set at the moment. Part of that is performance gear, the other part of that is
just data inundation… If we were doing the alerts the way you should be doing alerts, which is, we don’t have nearly
as many things commented out [i.e., removed] as we do now. (P6)
However, limiting the IDS signature set is often undesirable because, although it may reduce the number of false positives, it
is also likely to increase the number of false negatives, meaning that actual attacks go undetected. Those participants that did
restrict their signature set did so with the knowledge that they were probably missing many actual attacks, but had no
effective means of monitoring the large numbers of alerts. Pursuing the opposite strategy, analysts are forced to look only at
aggregated summaries of alerts. In this case, choosing which alerts to pursue can devolve to almost random selection:
“Generally I only pick one or two [alerts] of interest [to investigate]…based on what problems we’ve been having lately”
(P1). Picking the one or two alerts of interest out of the hundreds or thousands generated is one way of dealing with the
problem, but leaves many alerts unresearched.
Although the IDS is the primary means of detecting attacks, other monitoring systems and ad hoc data capture tools play an
important role, from simple “pings” to determine if a server is listening to systematically collecting bandwidth and system
usage statistics. These secondary monitoring tasks are useful in placing IDS alerts in a broader context, but also serve as a
means of alerting analysts to “hotspots in traffic”. For this, analysts create custom scripts to look at network data for “weird
things”, such as “the desktop machine that has ten times as much traffic as the next busiest machine on campus. You know
there is something wrong there” (P1). This kind of custom designed system, a “very crude anomaly detector” (P1), is a useful
supplement.
Simply keeping abreast of the latest attacks, vulnerabilities, and IDS signature updates could be a full time job in and of
itself. All of the participants listed numerous web sites, mailing lists, and people that they regularly monitored for this kind of
information. By far the most common resource was Internet mailing lists, which were continually watched for updated
information that pertains to each analysts’ idiosyncratic network environment, usually as part of the analyst’s daily ritual:
“my first stop every morning is the security websites to see what the threat du jour is and if there’s something that we can
craft a signature for if it’s not [already available]” (P6).
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Every analyst works in a unique environment, which is reflected in the diversity of their frequently read mailing lists. For
example, participants in academia monitored a variety of lists specific to security in higher education, while the analyst who
administered a number of Apache web servers on Linux machines monitored the mailing lists and web sites relevant to his
versions of Apache and Linux. Mailing lists monitored by multiple participants were general incidence and vulnerability lists
that attempt to quickly disseminate information about new bugs, vulnerabilities, and attacks. These high traffic lists, run by
the community of information security experts, deal with a broad range of security issues for a wide variety of platforms and
applications. They are general enough to pertain to nearly all environments, leaving it up to the analyst to determine which
notifications pertain to their particular environment.
In summary, monitoring the status of the environment involves interaction with an IDS and other monitoring tools as well as
following external information sources looking for vulnerabilities that match their particular environment. All of these
monitoring tasks are part of routine ID work, time-consuming, but not as cognitively challenging as the subsequent analysis
and response phases.
Analysis

The transition from the monitoring phase to the analysis phase begins with a security trigger event. For network monitoring,
this event is usually an IDS alert or recognition of an anomalous event occurring in the environment, such as a sudden spike
in traffic or user complaints of slow systems. Analysis of alerts involves not only the alert itself, but many sources of data
that provide the contextual information necessary to determine whether or not the alert is an actual intrusion and if so, to
assess its severity. For external resource monitoring (e.g., mailing lists), the announcement of a new vulnerability or attack
method necessitates further research to determine its applicability and possible severity to one’s network environment.
While monitoring is a part of the daily ID ritual, analysis and response are much more unpredictable, both in frequency and
duration. Analysis could happen once a week, or, more likely, several times a day. If an IDS alert, network anomaly or new
vulnerability is important, it could require the analyst to spend hours researching the problem before a diagnosis can be made.
However, there are times when the experience of the analyst is leveraged to immediately dismiss an alert as a false positive:
I know these criteria will always cause a false positive, even though there’s different event types being triggered,
you can always go and filter those out and you can just reassure yourself in two seconds that’s another false positive.
(P3)
Certain IDS output…certain things you can always believe is a known attack, just because the experience you have
and the rule signature may be so tuned to where it always detects that [attack]. (P8)
In the first case, the analyst can easily determine that an alert is nothing to worry about because of experience with similar
alerts in his particular environment with this signature’s criteria tells him that this alert is always a false positive. No further
investigation is necessary. On the other hand, there are times when it is immediately apparent that an alert is not a false
positive, based on his personal experience and intimate knowledge of the particular signature that generated the alert. If a
quick glance does not reveal the importance of the alert his investigation continues, relying upon personal experience and his
understanding of the alert’s context.
Analysts’ expertise includes general knowledge of network protocols and ID, but most importantly, knowledge of their
unique network environment, because what is normal activity in one environment may be indicative of illicit activity in
another. All of the participants echoed the importance of having an intimate knowledge of their particular context: “I can tell
if something is going on, I know the network” (P3). This results in a very steep learning curve for ID analysts. One must not
only learn the intricacies of network protocols and system operations, but how those are manifested in a particular
environment that is constantly changing. Keeping up with changing configurations in the operating environment is difficult,
but necessary to provide the context needed to analyze and diagnose an alert. This includes knowing the details of each
machine on the network. This can be as simple as recognizing that a Windows IIS web server attack targeted at a Linux
machine running Apache is clearly a false positive, though it becomes more challenging very quickly as the number and
diversity of machines on a network increase. For the analysts we interviewed, tracking this context is accomplished through
personal memory, without any external support. (Several participants did note that creating a database of this information
would be helpful.) The following example demonstrates the importance of keeping track of the environment:
An attack against an IIS-based web server is, that is a pretty severe alert, but if I have a filter that sits on that web
server that just throws those things aside before it gets passed to the web engine, then I consider that a false positive.
You know, me knowing my environment I can say, this web server, I set up this web server, it’s fine. (P3)
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When an alert describing an IIS web server attack is actually targeted at a host running an IIS web server, this should be of
immediate concern. However, the analyst knows that the particular targeted machine has a filtering mechanism in place that
cancels the particular request that the alert was generated on. The analyst knows this information because he set up the web
server; if another analyst were to get the alert, he may have a very different reaction, since in and of itself it “is a pretty severe
alert.” For many of the participants, this detailed knowledge of the environment was manageable enough that they could do a
reasonable job of using their memory to recognize certain target machines or services as being vulnerable or not to a
particular attack. Obviously, as the size of the network increases and the systems and network administration tasks are more
distributed, relying on personal memory for all of the details necessary for ID analysis becomes untenable.
The particular context of an alert is an important factor in IDS analysis. This contextual information is temporal; if the
analyst does not have a mechanism for capturing the information quickly, it could be lost. The importance of “knowing the
environment” is coupled with the problem that particular aspects of a network are always in flux. So, if the analyst knows, for
example, that a particular machine is supposed to only be running a web server, but that other services are actually running,
this is probably indicative of an attack. For example:
What operating system is this [host] running, what services is it running? Not just what services is it supposed to be
running, what is really running? (P7).
In order to gain this context, analysts rely on a myriad of data sources and tools that provide historical and current state
information. These information stores must be accessed through separate tools and procedures, collated, and correlated back
to the original data. Analysts often develop customized tools to facilitate this process. This process is challenging and often
requires creative technical solutions, but necessary to form a complete and accurate description of the IDS alert or anomalous
event. Performing the analysis of an IDS alert or vulnerability is grounded in the experience and expertise of the analyst, and
in the relevant contextual facts surrounding the activity. Successfully diagnosing an alert or vulnerability is a difficult,
complex task that requires an ability to improvise and develop custom tools and scripts to facilitate data collection and
correlation.
Response

The most common forms of response in ID are intervention, feedback, and reporting. Intervention depends on the role of the
analyst in the organization and organizational policies. Analysts who are also administrators of targeted machines would
likely intervene themselves. The response to an attack in progress could be as drastic as unplugging a network connection:
“probably the first thing would be unplug it” (P9). More common are responses that occur after the fact, such as patching the
vulnerability or reinstalling the compromised machine from backup. Especially in larger organizations, the analyst in charge
of ID is not the administrator of most machines. In this case, the response involves coordination among other administrators
in the organization. Feedback is usually directed at the IDS or other elements of the security infrastructure. It includes
tweaking or removing IDS signatures that generate an excessive amount of false positives, even if the signature was not
guaranteed to always generate a false positive. As noted earlier, this practice is dangerous because it can lead to false
negatives yielding undetected intrusions. Configuring and tweaking the IDS for the particular environment is one of the most
challenging ID tasks, but one that teaches the analyst the nuances of that environment and how the IDS operates in that
context. Feedback often involves submitting attack information to security mailing lists or vendors. Responses also include
generating incidence reports for legal action and reports for management.
IMPROVING INTRUSION DETECTION

The problems of information overload and false positives are currently being addressed by a number of IDS researchers and
vendors. Promising approaches include alert correlation (e.g., Debar and Wespi, 2001; Valdes and Skinner, 2001), data
mining (e.g., Lee, et al., 2000), and alert clustering (e.g., Julisch, 2003). However, the problems are not only related to IDS.
Recall that ID work involves multiple systems and information resources. True solutions must engage ID work holistically,
involving all of its component parts. Technical solutions will help, but will not keep pace as the size of networks increase and
security requirements become more stringent. Given our understanding of this as a socio-technical problem, this early
research directs us to both areas of organizational change and tool development for an integrated solution.
Organizational Improvements: Decoupling ID Tasks

One organizational solution to the central problems of the ID analyst, the lack of time to analyze all alerts and vulnerabilities
and the related information overload, is to decouple the core ID tasks. In particular, this would mean separating the
monitoring tasks from the analysis and response tasks, then restaffing accordingly. An organization’s security needs would be
better served by taking advantage of an analyst’s expertise for those tasks that actually require it and offloading the routine

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

1425

Goodall et al.

The Work of Intrusion Detection

work to those with less experience. Monitoring tasks are tedious, but are a necessary component of information security
practice. However, in contrast with the expertise and contextualized knowledge required for the analysis and response tasks,
the monitoring tasks are not nearly as cognitively demanding. Offloading the monitoring tasks would also allow less
experienced analysts and administrators to become familiar with the nuances of their particular environment, in effect
providing hands-on training in the area of ID that plays the central role in effective analysis: “knowing the environment.”
This apprenticeship would allow the novices to gradually come up to speed on the intricacies of a particular environment,
without having to go through the typical “trial by fire” learning process that most of our participants described. By shifting
the monitoring tasks away from the experts, their time would be freed up to focus on the challenges of analyzing, diagnosing,
and responding to alerts and vulnerabilities, as well as to proactively “harden” their systems and networks. This would result
in a more secure environment with the organizational resources shifted to the areas that best fit the requirements.
The junior staff tasked with monitoring could be trained off-site, learning the basics of networking protocols and ID. This
would provide them with the essential knowledge of networking and security. Their subsequent on-the-job training would
ground them in the particular details of their network environment. This contextual knowledge would be essential for them to
mature from monitoring to analysis and response tasks. This task-based staffing would provide organizations with more
flexibility in hiring new analysts, since they would not need to find analysts who have current ID experience in other
organizations, experience that would not necessarily be immediately convertible to a new environment anyway.
Technical Improvements: Monitoring Support Tools

As described earlier, monitoring the IDS and secondary systems is essentially an anomaly detection problem. Similarly,
searching external sources for relevant security related information involves matching the unique characteristics of one’s
network with the details of new vulnerabilities or attacks. These are tasks that an inexperienced analyst can be trained to do,
particularly if given the right IT support tools. For monitoring the environment, information visualization can provide
effective support due to its ability to highlight patterns and anomalies in large amounts of data. Information visualization is:
“the use of computer-supported, interactive, visual representations of abstract data to amplify cognition” (Card, Mackinlay,
and Shneiderman, 1999). Visualization takes advantage of strong human pattern recognition skills with visual representations
that can make patterns and anomalies obvious to the user (Card, et al., 1999). One of our participants, who works at a
university with several students available, describes the utility of such a visualization on a projection screen at the help desk:
[Someone could be] glancing up at it occasionally, notice anything that appears to be funky, even if they don’t call
me, even if they just write it down in a log and say ‘funky thing.’ (P1)
In offloading the monitoring tasks, visualization tools need to be designed so that anomalies can be easily flagged for later
analysis by more experienced analysts. Several researchers are working on applying information visualization principles to
ID monitoring (e.g., Erbacher, 2002). Decoupling the tasks of ID will require new technologies to be developed to support
less experienced analysts in accomplishing the monitoring tasks, some of which are already being prototyped. By combining
organizational change with technological evolution, security analysts will be better able to cope with the increasing security
threats in their expanding networks.
CONCLUSION

The work of intrusion detection is complex and challenging. Many researchers are searching for technological solutions to
alleviate some of the problems in ID. However, these solutions may work best in conjunction with organizational changes.
As the size and scope of organizational security requirements expand without a corresponding increase in staffing, an
increased workload is placed on the security analysts. We identified three distinct phases of ID work: monitoring, analysis,
and response. Because the analysis and response phases of ID are highly dependent on the expertise of the analysts, the
monitoring phase lends itself to being offloaded to less experienced staff. This workforce can be trained to do the specific
tasks associated with monitoring, interacting with new tools designed specifically to facilitate monitoring activities. This task
separation, coupled with emerging technologies such as information visualization, applied to the particular problems of the
monitoring tasks, can foster expertise in novices while giving the experts the time and resources to focus on those tasks that
require their particular skills. We are currently designing information visualization tools to support the network monitoring
and other ID tasks (for details, see: Komlodi, Goodall, and Lutters, 2004). We also plan to investigate the applicability of
other technologies to fit the particular needs of each of the ID tasks.
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